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0. Introduction: Problems, Institutionalism and Theory of the 
Leisure Class 
 
Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class, by secondary title “an economic study in the 
evolution of institutions”, at the time of its publication in 1899 did create much sensation; 
the use of sarcasm and a method very much different to the formalist mainstream made 
and continues to make its establishment as a work of economic theory difficult. The essay 
focuses upon the broad range of influence of a special class of society - the so called leisure 
class; however it does not try to give a systematic account of the influence or its dynamics, 
but rather consists of a series of consecutive observations traversed by the recurring notion 
of the leisure class. Its fundamental conclusion is that people consume in order to impress 
their surrounding society. In his essays Veblen refers to many different examples (social 
customs, aesthetics, institutions in general), which are mere manifestations of that very 
principle. The leisure class, which is the leading class of society not only in terms of power 
and wealth but also in terms of conspicuous expenditure,1 finds itself under strong critique 
by Veblen. Quite often reviewers therefore saw but a blunt “attack on existing institutions”2 
- an essay on sociology based on a few precise observations3. In his history of economic 
analysis Joseph Schumpeter mentions Thorstein Veblen and Theory of the Leisure Class only 
                                                 
1 i.e. expenditure as a demonstration of wealth, in order to gain in terms of honorific standing in society.  
2 LESTER WARD, Review of Theory of the Leisure Class, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 5, No. 6 
(May, 1900), pp. 829 
3 e.g. the review by literary critic William Dean Howells: HOWELLS, Review of Theory of the Leisure Class, in: 
Literature. An International Gazette of Criticism, No. 16, New Series (Apr., 28, 1899), pp. 361-362; and 
No. 17, New Series (May, 5, 1899). 
remark: even on a basic level Theory of the Leisure Class does deal with scarcity; it does try to answer a 
question of efficiency, of how to cope best with the scarcity of natural resources. How can the burden of 
labor, to satisfy one’s sustenance, be alleviated? The prevailing socioeconomic system is inefficient in Veblen’s 
opinion; collectively inefficient behavior/institutions arise because of various social dynamics with 
involvement of a special class - the so called leisure class. Theory of the Leisure Class is an inquiry into the 
causes of the acts of collective underachievement, identifying these absorbing institutions, deriving them 
from their archaic precedents. Comp. also to: ANDERSON (1933), The unity of Veblen’s theoretical system, p24 
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parenthetically and accuses his work of being in economic sociology4.  Some even speak of 
it not having contributed anything to economic theory.5 
The broad range of disagreement as to the value of the contribution is foremost the result 
of its fundamentally different approach to economics:  “Veblen always meant the work to 
be appreciated as a contribution to social and economic theory, […] This aspect of the 
work has received insufficient attention, in part because of a failure of many commentators 
to appreciate the intellectual environment of the 1890s and thereby the substance and 
stature of Veblen’s intellectual achievement”.6 Discontent with prevailing economic 
explanatory systems, Veblen criticizes their insufficiencies and purposefully suggests what 
has been known as Evolutionary Economics; a methodological position decidedly different 
from the upcoming Neoclassicism. In Theory of the Leisure Class he implements this 
program to the extent suggested in the secondary title – Theory of the Leisure Class is not a 
new economic theory proper7 (or a universal theory) but a specific study of institutions8. As 
such it does not feature an ahistorical economic problem in the manner of price theory, 
international economics etc. (questions: How can price differences, inflation be 
explained?); neither does it purposefully advocate economic policy considerations 
(questions: how can unemployment, inflation be avoided).9  
 
What it does feature, is the solution to a series of fundamental methodological problems. It 
is the solution to these problems that enabled the new economic movement succinctly 
called Institutionalism to position itself as an economic theory. It is not only the purpose of 
                                                 
4 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER , History of Economic Analysis, Routledge 1994, p763 
5 KURT DOPFER, Thorstein Veblens Beitrag zur ökonomischen Theorie, in: K.-D. Grüske (Hrsg.), 
Kommentarband zum Faksimile Nachdruck der Erstausgabe von Thorstein Veblen: The Theory of the 
Leisure Class, Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen, 2000, S. 89-144. 
6 GEOFFREY HODGSON, Veblen and Evolutionary Economics, in: Samuels Warren J, The founding of 
institutional economics, Routledge 1998, p190 
7 A. M Day in his review writes  “Professor Veblen has not presented the theory of the leisure class, but a part 
of one theory”: A.M DAY., Review of Theory of the Leisure Class,  Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 
(Jun., 1901), p369  or Hodgson Geoffrey, The Evolution of Institutional Economics – Agency Structure and 
Darwinism in American Institutionalism, Routledge 2004, p141 
8 A. M DAY (1901), p367: “All this is, of course, a study of motives” 
9 This is also a common characteristic of all works of Institutionalism. See HODGSON GEOFFREY, The 
Approach of Institutional Economics, Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVI (March 1998), p170 
Note that certainly Veblen wanted to some extent explain economic aspects with involvement of the leisure 
class as in the consumer behaviour with regard to luxury goods.  
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this thesis to identify and reproduce these problems, their respective problem situations 
and problem formulations, but furthermore to outline the capacity of Veblen’s Theory of 
the Leisure Class and its implemented program of Evolutionary Economics to solve them in 
a different manner than other contemporary economic theories do; it will also be shown, 
that the solutions admitted by Veblen entail altered explanatory power and thereby validate 
the existence of a definitive economic theory.  
The history of economic thought is a history of problems and their respective solutions, as 
is the history of any scientific discipline10; the solution of problems triggers problems 
which in turn require new solutions etc. A new theory hence has to have problem solving 
capabilities that make it somehow superior to preceding theories; that is, it has to be able to 
solve more problems or admit better solutions. The depiction of those problems and their 
respective solution requires foremost the exact formulation of the former and the latter; in 
addition it requires depiction of the respective problem situation; that is the initial 
formulation and the solutions to those very problems by other authors. The first part of 
this text, discusses basic properties of scientific explanations, aims to illustrate the nature of 
the problems in question. It also aims furthermore, as the first part of the problem 
situation, not only to outline the different approaches in economics to solve those very 
problems but also to give an overview of the economic theories that preceded the 
formulation of Evolutionary Economics. Part two assesses the problem solving capabilities 
of Veblen’s Economic Approach: A preliminary chapter provides an introduction 
Evolutionary Economics. A chapter on Veblen’s criticism of contemporary theories 
recapitulates the problem situation from Veblen’s perspective, identifies the different 
problem formulations and leads to the chapter which outlines the problem solutions of 
Veblen in detail; the latter chapter also assesses explanatory power. A fourth part briefly 
comments on the solutions provided by Veblen and states the conclusion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Quoted from KARL MILFORD, A Note on Menger’s Problem Situation and Non-essentialist Approach to 
Economics, in: Austrian Economics in Transition – From Carl Menger to Friedrich Hayek, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2010, p159 
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1. Explanations in the Social Sciences 
 
The social sciences ever since have strived to explain human (inter)action on a systematic 
level, controlled by factual evidence. However, data in the social sciences is very different 
in comparison to those of the natural sciences - controlled experiments which keep 
variables constant are hardly possible. Economics in comparison to other social sciences 
deals foremost with the implications of scarcity (and concomitant phenomena) and thereto 
related human action. Approaches in the social sciences have striven to comply with 
idealistic conceptions of a natural science. As a result while only a small group of heterodox 
theorists adhere to informal approaches, Positive Economics and ultimately Neoclassicism 
adhere to a more formal method - a method characterized by mathematics, generalizations 
and the use of deductive logic. Veblen however belongs to the former; his approach 
emphasizes the importance of explanatory power of an economic theory. Differing 
solutions to fundamental problems of explanation outlined in this chapter express that very 
view.  
 
Explanatory Power 
 
The performance of an explanatory system in economics unanimously rests heavily on its 
ability to predict11 - to guarantee policy advice: in Milton Friedman’s conceptions of 
Positive Economics it is to be judged by precision, scope and experience-conformity12, all 
with regard to the latter; hence if a theory is able to predict more precisely and if it is not 
refuted by succeeding observations, it is performing well. However prediction does not 
necessarily imply explanation. Blaug gives an illustrative example13: Newton’s Theory of 
Gravitation ignores all characteristics of moving objects but their positions, point masses 
and velocities; his universal law states that “bodies attract each other with a force that varies 
directly with the product of their masses and inversely with the square of the distance 
                                                 
11 E.g. WILBER CHARLES/HARRISON ROBERT, The Methodological Basis of Institutional Economics: Pattern 
Model, Storytelling, and Holism, Journal of Economic Issues (pre-1986); Mar 1978, p66 
12 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in: Essays in Positive Economics, University of 
Chicago Press 1966, p3 
13 MARK BLAUG, The Methodology of Economics: or how economists explain, Cambridge University 1980, p7 
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between them”. The law’s predictions include trajectories of objects, the occurrences of 
tides, the course of planets etc. However Newton is unable to assign a cause to the force he 
identified, it just miraculously acts at a distance; the motion that produces gravity remains 
unexplained. So despite its extraordinary predictory powers, the explanatory power is only 
humble. Another example: Darwin’s theory of evolution is not able to state a universal law 
or to make exact predictions. When asked if a certain species is able to adapt to its fatally 
changing surrounding (environment, climate) the theory suggests that this might happen, 
but it is not going to assign any number to the percentage of the population that actually 
adapts and hence survives. Darwinism on the other hand provides a cause for the variation 
of species: natural selection. Freudian depth psychology does in the same manner advocate 
a certain method of explaining symptoms but is unable to make exact attributions or 
remotely suggest universal laws (which ultimately would lead to a clear-cut method of 
cure). In sum the explanatory power of an explanation in comparison to the overall 
performance decidedly depends on its ability to account for the phenomena in question by 
providing a causal explanation, i.e. unveiling the causal mechanisms behind a certain 
phenomenon.14 A causal explanation is an explanation with sufficient informational 
content15. By distinctly stating a cause it restricts the explanation in terms of logical 
possibilities (events, processes that are not going to be present as a result of the 
explanation); hence if one of the causes would be invalid then the theory would abruptly 
be refuted. As a result, the more informational content a (causal) explanation has, the 
higher its explanatory power, and likewise the more likely is its refutation. The explanation 
that all economic phenomena are caused by god, does not enable the scientist to make 
predictions, however it is a causal statement; due lack of informational content it is not of 
high explanatory power. In a similar manner a ceteris paribus clause if not specified, voids 
any statement of informational content and makes refutation impossible. In sum a theory 
with high explanatory power might so in the first place lead to the formulation of a theory 
                                                 
14 GEOFFREY HODGSON, How Economics Forgot History – The problem of historical specificity in social science, 
Routledge 2001 p242, Blaug (1980), p13 
15 The explanatory property “informational content” receives its motivation foremost from the position 
against tautologies. However a causal explanation must entail informational content. HANS ALBERT, 
Marktsoziologie und Entscheidungslogik – Zur Kritik der reinen Ökonomik, Mohr Siebeck 1998, p110 
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with high predictory power; both types of power or performance of a theory are highly 
distinct and only assess designated qualities.  
 
1.1 Methodological Problems 
 
1.1.1 Causality 
 
Causality involves the problem of how to account for phenomena in terms of cause, but 
also how to devise a truly scientific explanation of an event. All explanation is causal16; i.e. 
an explanation of a certain phenomenon (explanandum) cites a causal phenomenon 
(explanans) – an event that serves as a cause. A basic event-event explanation according to 
David Hume involves an earlier event (ball A hitting ball B) that serves as a cause and 
explanation to another event (ball B moving). Hume contested, that causal connections 
themselves can be observed; the principle of causation cannot be derived by experience. It 
involves the imputation of cause and effect with regard to the events (ball hitting, ball 
moving) in question; an observer makes silently the assumption that the reaction he has 
observed will continue in the future. Later Kant argued that all causal relation necessarily 
depends on imputations by the observer. How can hence a truly scientific explanation be 
devised?  The first standard model in this manner (which is now equal to the common 
men’s view on the method of science) was formulated by John Stuart Mill in 1848 in his 
System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. He commended proceeding on the basis of 
unprejudiced observation from the facts via inductive interference to the formulation of 
universal laws; thence further induction leaves the scientist with statements of wider 
generality: theories. Finally the statements are subject to a comparison of empirical 
consequences with observed facts. The hypothetico-deductive model adopted after the turn 
of the century can be considered the next step, it conceived another structure for truly 
scientific explanations: one universal law plus a statement of initial conditions constitute 
the explanans, from which an explanandum, a statement about some event one seeks 
explanation for, is deduced. The implications are grave: “The universal laws are not derived 
                                                 
16 E.g, JON ELSTER, Explaining Social Behavior – More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge 2007, 
p7 
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by inductive generalization from individual instances; they are merely hypotheses, inspired 
conjectures … that may be tested by using them to make predictions about particular 
events but which are not reducible to observations about events.”17 i.e. the hypothetico-
deductive model does only work via deduction. The system entails what has been known as 
the symmetry thesis: explanation and prediction involving the same logical rules; the only 
difference - explanations being after the event and predictions before. The symmetry thesis 
has been criticized broadly. Positive, formal economics however builds on the symmetry 
thesis. 
 
1.1.2 Agency vs. Structure 
 
(Explanatory) reductionism18 by doctrine entails that complex phenomena should be 
explained in terms of one level or one type of unit; physical reductionism for example 
requires all phenomena to be explained solely in terms of physical characteristics, biological 
reductionism claims that all (social) phenomena can be explained in terms of biological 
characteristics. The social sciences19 and hence economics discern two major entities from 
which all socioeconomic phenomena shall be explained: agency and structure; the resulting 
dichotomy is known as the agency-structure problem; its ontological question: To what 
fundamental entity can an explanation (in economics) be reduced? 
The human agent is being characterized by his ability for deliberation and forethought 
upon the context and possible outcomes of an action.20 A social structure on the other 
hand is a set of significant relations between individuals that can lead to causal 
interactions21; a social structure can amount to anything starting from language, 
conventions, it can be a set of common unique meanings. Structure can outlive individuals 
and is hence ontologically entirely different from individual behavior; it cannot be reduced 
                                                 
17 BLAUG (1980), p5 
18 Reductionism shall not be confounded with reduction. Reduction is a necessary means for science, albeit 
complete analytical reduction being impossible. 
19 The agency structure dichotomy primordially stems from sociology. 
20 Not all human action might be deliberate, but still the possibility persists. 
21 GEOFFREY HODGSON, The Evolution of Institutional Economics – Agency Structure and Darwinism in 
American Institutionalism, Routledge 2004, p12 
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to it. A special type of the social structure22, the institution is ubiquitous in the writings of 
Veblen and his contemporaries: it is, broadly defined, a set of embedded social rules that 
organize the relations between agents; it is within those rules to change purpose or 
preferences of agents.  
In the history of thought, the conception of society being more than the sum of individuals 
preceded atomistic notions that started to emerge at the age of enlightenment. 
Physiocratism as well as German historical school made frequent allusions to an “economic 
body”; Adam Smith’s conception of the invisible hand hinted the failure of the letting 
solely the individual’s interest account for the forces of the market. Karl Marx had his own 
ideas of structure: He perceived structure to be consisting of the totality of relations of 
production, molding thereof a frame of political consciousness.  
Two opposing ways of treatment with the problem can hence be identified, both having 
their respective adherents, advantages and disadvantages respectively – one appointing 
structures as the ultimate explanatory units, the second claiming that individuals are the 
ultimate ontological elements. Neoclassicism belongs to the latter group. 
 
Methodological Collectivism 
 
Evidently a holistic/collectivistic explanation suggests that individual action is only 
properly understood if the individuals are considered parts of a bigger picture – their 
behavior can be entirely explained in terms of social, structural, cultural or institutional 
phenomena; the very positions individuals are occupying in the scheme then define their 
actions – “determining the values, ideas, knowledge, preference, purposes and constraints 
faced by them”.23 Thus when analyzing human (inter)action, one is supposed to be looking 
for the entities which everybody is a part of - as for example according to: social class, 
political affiliation, religious confession; however what is of interest is not the active 
participation, but the passively adopted set of rules and beliefs: e.g. can the founder of a 
                                                 
22 it is sensible to distinguish between an institutional and a relational structure, the latter only concerned 
with the relationships themselves 
23 FERNANDO TOBOSO, Explaining the process of change taking place in legal rules and social norms: The cases of 
institutional economics and new institutional economics, European Journal of Law and Economics, vol 2,1 
1995, p4 
 11
certain organization be long gone and nevertheless exert a certain influence on the latter – 
as by some sort of codex or unwritten law. Popper does a simple illustration24: a group 
consisting of A and B possesses another character than a group consisting of B and C; if 
some or all members of a certain group die, it is however possible that the pristine 
character is being kept alive but only if they did ingress into the group bit by bit, instead of 
mutually forming a new group together; thereby he stresses the history of a group as an 
important factor. Adherents include most prominently Karl Marx and the French 
sociologist Èmile Durkheim.   
Frequent criticism stems from the fact, that methodological collectivism makes the 
individual the mere puppet of social forces25 - the individual is conflated into the social 
structure. Collectivism emphasizes on social constraints by which it provides an ultimate 
account for the individual’s action - it is explained only in terms of coercion (Durkheim!) 
by the social organism; Karl Marx’ capitalists act as such because they occupy a capitalist 
role within the social structure. Hence collectivism lacks perspective on the (cognitive) 
mechanisms (e.g. psychology) by which the individual is fundamentally altered, his 
dispositions are truly molded respectively. 
 
Methodological Individualism 
 
Proposes the atomistic structure of a satisfactory explanation in the social sciences; 
according to it, social phenomena can be explained as the unintended result of the 
interplay of intended individual actions; thus, bottom line: all social interactions are 
interactions among individuals – that is: those involved; so does for example the 
entrepreneur’s profit maximizing result in the minimization of profit for everybody.26 An 
individualist explanation would therefore consider the Popperian society mentioned 
beforehand, or the example of the organization of the long gone founder, not more than 
                                                 
24 KARL POPPER., Das Elend des Historizismus, Mohr Siebeck 2003 p16 
25 e.g. WILLIAM GORTON, Karl Popper and the Social Sciences, State University of New York Press 2006, p19 
26 The Austrians since stressed the notion of a spontaneous order.  
Comp.: KENNETH ARROW, Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Sixth Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association (May, 1994), p3 
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the sum of its parts - a mere sum of all individual interests and policies – therefore strongly 
denying the existence of any mysterious social entity which turns the mass of individuals 
into a society. Traditional economics is built very much on the foundations of 
methodological individualism; the individual agent makes decisions (to save, to invest, to 
produce etc.) in order to determine the economy’s overall course, the allocation of 
resources respectively.  
 
Frequent confusion stems from the question whether methodological individualism means 
explanations in terms of individuals alone, or in terms of individuals plus individual 
interaction or social structures27. Can Adam Smith be considered an individualist, or does 
his notion of the invisible hand involve a holist explanation? It depends on whether social 
interaction is meant to be included. If it was to mean the latter than there would be few 
objections, however it would not warrant the title of methodological individualism. In fact 
the idea of socially determined individuals will always involve entities that cannot be 
explained solely in terms of individuals. If institutions are admitted, then true 
individualism requires an explanation in terms of individuals too, which in turn could 
again be partly explained by institutions etc. The result is an infinite regress in which no 
position, neither institutional nor individual, possesses explanatory supremacy over the 
other.  
Carl Menger proposes a solution to the problem. In his “Untersuchungen über die Methode 
der Sozialwissenschaften” he insinuates that even social institutions (which might not at 
once reveal any individual motives behind them) might be explained via methodological 
individualism; he gives the example of money: on the one hand can the institution of 
certain coins be the result of a legislative act, an explicit convention, but it does not 
necessarily have to be so. He proposes as well an organic process developing from standard 
economic conduct, which makes certain goods apt for the task of being mutually accepted, 
to be traded anywhere and anytime against anything; Menger stresses that everybody needs 
not even to be constantly aware of the obvious advantages that certain mutually craved 
goods possess, in comparison to goods that are unfit for barter – economic success will 
                                                 
27 See also footnote 115 
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guide the individual28; thus it is in the end spontaneous individual interests29 (without any 
higher good consideration!) that make for the advent of the institution of money (coin).  
According to Menger it would appear that there was a basic institution-free-state, from 
which then institutions would then spontaneously appear. However, again there would be 
institutions involved, which would have to be explained etc.: How do people in this 
institution-free-state of nature e.g. converse with each other? Language in some 
rudimentary form would always be the last resort of an institution that would remain. The 
construction of a basic layer that traverses the infinite regress is pragmatic but not feasible.  
The popular notion of methodological individualism is in a more narrow sense not 
possible; explanations cannot be reduced solely to individuals without any conflation of 
social phenomena upon the individual.  
 
The agency structure dichotomy is not a problem that can be “solved”; rather it shows the 
difficulties arising from explanations categorically resting on of the two social entities in 
question. Marxism recognizes the powerful rule of structures over individuals - the 
explanatory burden however rests heavily on structure. Consequently traditional economics 
(by its credo being the science of choice) departing from an allegedly institution-free-
ensemble, by its methodological premise is impelled to take the purposes and preferences 
of the individual as given. Economic theories from either alignment fail to give account as 
to how individual intentions or preferences may change. 
 
1.1.3 Decision Modeling 
 
Explanations in economics also entail explanations of human behavior and human 
planning: Economic phenomena (in some way) always involve the individual and the 
choices he makes. In order to explain the decisions of man one has to account for the 
                                                 
28 It is chosen out of frequency and convenience and it  is all the more convenient and frequent because it is 
chosen 
29 CARL MENGER, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie 
insbesondere, Duncker & Humblot 1883, p178 : „…sociale Institution als das unreflektierte Ergebnis, als die 
unbeabsichtigten Resultate spezifisch individueller Bestrebungen der Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft“ 
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individual’s capacity to reason by theoretically modeling it. How can this model be 
construed? The answer can, but does not have to result in recourse to psychology. 
According to David Hume, reason is the slave of the passions as outlined in his “Treatise 
on Human Nature”. His notions were famously updated by Jeremy Bentham who adopted 
utility as the measure for pleasure or pain an agent feels as the result of an outcome of a 
decision; hence according to him, ontologically the faculty of reason decides only between 
good and bad, assigning values accordingly. The classical models of “rational choice” that 
resulted in the discipline of economics adopted these notions30; they have been further 
developed on by succeeding (marginalist) authors. 
 
Rational Choice 
 
Starting with Adam Smith’ Wealth of Nations, economics as a social science has been 
propelled by the desire to emulate physics and other natural sciences in order to achieve 
universality of scope. (Neo)Classical economics has since dominated economic psychology 
with a set of a priori notions that preferably allow the broadest range of application: It 
assumes that agents evaluate all choices in form of comparing all the outcome’s respective 
expected utilities and then choose the alternative that maximizes it; utility being a measure 
for the net sensuous/monetary gain of a certain action. Central idea is furthermore that all 
individual behavior is grounded in terms of a given preference function specifying values of 
utility, which has to be maximized. Specific inputs, e.g. consumer goods or the utility of 
others, enter as an argument in the function and hence utility is assigned in accordance. 
Individuals – so it is assumed – make a rational choice by maximizing their utility:  human 
behavior is explained on the basis of preference functions given limited resources and other 
constraints. However preference functions are the mere result of a deliberation process by 
the individual making the choice in concern.  The popular misconception of the 
neoclassical agent being a greedy and selfish machine is only partly true: altruism can very 
                                                 
30 Revealed preference theory as a result of the contributions of Samuelson (1947) has surpassed the phase of 
admitting any psychological assumptions whatsoever (as it is the case with early rational choice since it 
acknowledged a process of mental valuation). Revealed preference theory assigns utility as the result of a 
choice. The causal utility fallacy comments on the confusion between the two opposing concepts of utility. 
See KEN BINMORE, Rational Decisions, Princeton University Press 2008, p19 
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well be modeled – the agent can gain utility by enhancing those of others, all depending on 
the utility function; the model can allow for behavior that is selfish as well as good or bad, 
since it says nothing about the origin or nature of the objectives: this is what is meant by 
given preferences. Predictions in collaboration with rational choice models can lead to 
meaningful, falsifiable predictions however only at the point of bringing in additional 
assumptions; typically these include the existence of perfect information (in order to allow 
agents to evaluate the strategic choices) or the homogeneity of agents (all agents share the 
same utility function).  
 
Not only because of its alignment with methodological individualism, the model of 
rational choice is subject to criticism: methodological individualism in combination with 
rational choice does lead to individual preferences being the smallest fundamental unit; the 
latter of which are ultimately taken for granted in such an economic inquiry: A model of 
reasoning that starts at given preferences, does not need psychology as an explanatory 
device – this is a major advantage. On the other hand given preferences do not relate to 
any underlying causes of the choices made by agents.31 A causal explanation of the choice 
behavior is being given up in favor of an explanation that could encompass the pursuit of 
all sorts of ends by an agent. This reduces the explanatory power of an explanation. 
 
1.1.4 Specificity  
 
Models in the social sciences do not only have to consider the structured relations between 
agents, but also the reactions of agents according to the changing circumstances: as a result 
a theory is being confronted with an abundance of information it has to account for. A 
general theory in economics as in every other science simplifies by combining different 
phenomena in a common explanatory framework; a general theory is a theory that omits 
details - it unifies in order to reduce contingencies; specific circumstances hence enter the 
theory as mere parameters. However unification may come at a high cost: while a general 
theory may be able to fit all possible phenomena within its framework, it might be unable 
                                                 
31 For example:  KLIEMT HARTMUT, Philosophy and Economics I: Methods and Models, Oldenbourg 2009, p53 
or BINMORE (2008), p20 
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to properly fulfill predictory or explanatory tasks required of a scientific theory. In the 
history of economic theory a general theory has been most explicitly pursued by Ricardo 
who advocated the use of universal conclusions, derived from a set of fundamental and 
general propositions; his method had been criticized Malthus on grounds of its 
simplification and generalization. Keynes in his General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money (similarly to all succeeding proponents of general equilibrium theory) also 
clearly advocated a general approach to market equilibrium conditions. 
Albeit many of the differences between economic systems of inquiry might be insignificant 
and may hence be captured by a general theory (a tailored general theory might even apply 
to various specific problems) there might be essential differences that cannot be taken care 
of solely in the change of parameter values. 
 
A theory acknowledging the problem of Specificity in contrast suggests that there are 
different socioeconomic systems and it points to the limits of explanatory unification: 
substantially different economic systems require different theories – the unique 
applicability of one system is challenged32. This does not doubt the view that there are not 
problems of timeless validity to be solved by economics, but hints that there might be 
decisive factors involved which change with respect to time and/or setting; they require a 
significantly different theory and therefore impose restrictions on ontological explanatory 
unification; this is to say there might be a necessity for distinctive, particularistic theories, 
each applicable to their respective setting. Socio-economic systems differing from each 
other by a time span of a few hundred years might involve important variations in and 
mechanisms of production and allocation or in terms of cultural rules and norms33. 
Specificity as formulated by Hodgson34 is foremost the problem how to deal with different 
                                                 
32 German economist Meyer uses the following expression :“das Faktum der historischen Relativität alles 
Sozialen” WILHELM MEYER, Grundlagen des ökonomischen Denkens, Mohr Siebeck 2002, p214 
33 Traditional economics will disregard the problem since it challenges its claim of universality; Robert Solow 
comments: “My impression is that the best and brightest in the profession proceed as if economic is the 
physics of society. There is a single universally valid model of the world. It only needs to be applied. You 
could drop a modern economist from a time machine…at any time, in any place along with his or her 
personal computer; he or she could set up in business without even bothering to ask what time or place.” 
ROBERT SOLOW, Economic History and Economics, The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 2, (May, 
1985), p330 
34 HODGSON (2001) 
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historical periods that each include their respective institutional setting; however specificity 
involves also the question as to how far to the outskirts of unification a general theory is 
allowed to go, without forfeiting the unique (institutional) setting of any problem 
situation35. A theory focusing on decisions of the capitalist firm might be totally unapt to 
cope with the requirements of a theory to explain consumer behavior.  
A theory focusing on (e.g timesensitive) specificities automatically entails a more dynamic 
framework of analysis than a general theory. Change becomes an important factor since it 
may directly determine the specificities that ultimately influence economic phenomena. 
Why and how do these specificities change? Under a static framework these questions are 
not of concern, in a dynamic framework they are fundamental. Specificity in this manner 
may challenge the static applicability of the utility concept: in a specificity-sensitive theory 
can mankind no longer be represented by one type of utility function; unifying 
assumptions as in “ad hoc agent homogeneity” are void.  
As a result of philosophical upheaval in nineteenth century Europe, two newly emanating 
economic theories acknowledging the importance of specificities have evolved: the 
historical school and Marxism.  
The problem of specificities in the social sciences is not a dichotomy: i.e. resulting 
theoretical compounds cannot be divided into “unificationists” and “particularists”; every 
scientific theory has to some extent adhere to both branches – every theory must ask itself, 
what specificities it omits or to what extent it is general – independent from the questions 
whether it considers economics from the viewpoint of heterodox or traditional economics. 
In any case there are consequences in terms of explanatory power. 
 
1.2. Problem Situation I: Economic Explanations in the 19th century 
 
The incentive to solve problems differently does not arise without previous solutions that 
have proven to be ineffective and/or have the potential to be enhanced. Economic 
methodology in the 19th century with its highly dissimilar positions proved a fertile ground 
                                                 
35 This is what Hodgson admits as “differences in socioeconomic space” , HODGSON (2001) p24 
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thereto. However not every problem of the problems in question is explicitly elaborated on 
by every economic school; this chapter aims to give a survey of relevant positions. 
In the 19th century English Classicism was slowly replaced in the second half of the century 
by the Hegelian influenced Historical School emanating from Germany. German 
philosophers at that time debated over the question as to what constituted the difference 
between the natural sciences and the social sciences: Can the same methods be applied, or 
do the social sciences require other tools to gain knowledge? Two fundamentally different 
branches of thought evolved: Antinaturalism was against the search of universal and 
timeless laws - the methods of natural science were inapplicable in the social sciences. They 
stressed the analysis of specific events in time. A position in accordance with Naturalism 
however believed in the very opposite:  laws and theory can be acquired quite similarly to 
the natural sciences; these laws have to be verified empirically. Differences in 
Methodenstreit between German Historicist Schmoller and Austrian Marginalist Menger 
were result of different views on this very problem36 
In the 19th century Karl Marx publicized all his major works, thereby not only laying the 
cornerstone for socioeconomic uppheaval but profoundly changing the philosophical 
landscape of traditional Hegelianism. Moreover, previously shunned evolutionary theories 
started to become accepted in the scientific community. J.B. Lamarck had already unveiled 
the first theory of evolution and Charles Darwin did so in 1859; Spencer introduced 
“survival of the fittest” on the social realm, proclaiming the ideas of social Darwinism. 
 
1.2.1 Classicisal economics 
 
Classical methodology is very different from the ideas of modern economics. The premises 
of a theory by its verificationist credo do not focus on validation of the latter but rather on 
its “applicability”. Those premises consist of introspections and observations and via 
deductive logic leads to the formulation of implications. Classical methodology is a 
defensive methodology, making it secure against attacks.37 However classical economics 
                                                 
36 The simplification of Naturalism vs. Antinaturalism is not a correct in that respect. Both sides did position 
themselves not uniquely on one side. 
37 BLAUG (1980) p51 
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believes in the existence of universal laws and sees individual action as the ultimate 
explanans of economic phenomena38. 
While Smith does not constantly apply the same method and does not directly state his 
rules of explanation, Ricardo implicitly advocates the hypothetico-deductive model. In his 
1836 essay On the definition of political economy John Stuart Mill for the first time clearly 
states the modus operandi: In his conception the science is resting on deductive analysis, 
psychological premises and abstraction from human behavior. “Disturbing causes” are the 
prime cause of the “uncertainty” in the social sciences. Mill compares it to friction in 
mechanics. These primarily non-assignable deductions will in certain time be uncovered by 
science and admitted. Verification for Mill is necessary; however a failure to verify a certain 
prediction is not equal to a refutation of the theory. The predictions of classical economics 
only amount to so called “tendency laws”, predicting only a tendency to a certain result. 
The human model of Mill does not take man as he is but makes an abstraction: he admits 
only a pecuniary motive and its simplified constraining motives (aversion to labor, costly 
indulgences) – an economic man. Mill does not admit induction to the social sciences 
because of the “frequency of composite causes”. Mill’s classical methodology in this 
manner is very much verificationist, explanations favored to predictions. When it was clear 
that the predictions of Ricardo or Malthus had failed, Mill retained them on grounds of 
their assumptions, which are true “by virtue of being based on self evident facts of human 
experience”39. Cairnes confirms in his Character and Logical Method of Political Economy: 
Economics is a hypothetical science, making conditional predictions about the future, 
always subject to a ceteris paribus clause (what would, or what tends to take place). Only 
qualitative predictions are possible in economics – the discrepancies are caused by 
economic disturbances; a logically consistent theory can never be refuted. 
 
1.2.2 Historical School of Economics 
 
                                                 
38 HANS ALBERT, Die Idee rationaler Praxis und die ökonomische Tradition, Forschungsgemeinschaft für 
Nationalökonomie (Hrsg) Walter Adolf Jöhr Vorlesung 1995, p17 
39 BLAUG (1980) p68 
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German Historical School focuses on establishing a new “historical-realistic”40 approach to 
vanquish the highly abstract and theoretical notions of traditional economics. Adherents 
can broadly be divided into two different branches: the Older School (e.g. Roscher, Knies, 
Hildebrand) and the Younger School (Schmoller, Sombart).41  
Adopting Hegelian ideas of history as a progressive but non-linear development (in stark 
contrast to notions of societal equilibrium beforehand) the economists of German 
Historical School react to deductive and individualist methods of British classical political 
economy. The Historical school has entirely new ideas what concerns method and 
responsibilities of economics: they stress the descriptive acquisition of social institutions 
and socioeconomic phenomena and the depiction of historical sequences regarding 
economic entities in favor of the elaboration of “ideals” i.e. theory. Causes of specific 
economic phenomena (i.e. explanations), can in this manner be found by systematically 
comparing cases – i.e. by induction. The ultimate explanans of economic developments are 
institutional setups and conjunctures as determined by factors like climate, geography, 
technology, or cognitive features as human motives, attitudes and aptitudes.  The notion of 
the classical economists’ “economic man” is therefore perceived as a very blunt 
simplification, which reduces all motives to self interest and the pursuit of wealth. Albeit 
there might be situations in which man acts in accordance with those motives (there might 
even be some people who always do act accordingly), homo oeconomicus as a general 
assumption is wrong. Wagner and Schmoller propose an enhanced psychology42 by adding 
various different motives (egoistic and non egoistic). 
The historical school retains holistic doctrines43: Not the individual but larger social bodies 
create economic phenomena. The state and society are being conceived as an organism: 
This organism has a mind of its own – which is in turn also the collective will – a thinking 
spiritual entity – its Geist. The latter which is also the collective Geist of the entire nation 
                                                 
40 MEYER (2002), p211 
41 Members of the so called English Historical School (Ingram, Cliffe, Ashley, Cunningham) are not directly 
related to its German counterpart and tried in a similar manner to make a stand against the fact-voided works 
of Mill, Jevons and Marshall on their own terms. 
42 MEYER (2002), p215 
43 LARS UDEHN, Methodological Indvididualism: Background, History and Meaning, Routledge 2001, p24; 
POPPER K.R., Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde Band II – Falsche Propheten: Hegel, Marx und die Folgen, 
Mohr Siebeck 2003, p46 
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shall hence be studied as a whole. This is connected to the formulation of 
Nationalökonomie, the study of the economics of the nation; it tries to grasp the essence of 
the spirit in the history of events. 
In sum German historical school distances itself from abstract and deductive economics of 
the classical school by three major objections44: 1) Incompleteness - the finding that 
classicism negates the influence of institutional, psychological and cultural factors. 2) 
Unrealism - axiomatic and highly hypothetical (a priori45) causes as suggested by deductive 
economics are simply unrealistic and unable to explain actual events. 3) Historical 
specificity - certain general laws are confined in their validity to a narrow episode in history 
(i.e. to a certain set of institutions), and their unrestrained application is void. Only 
specific combinations of motivations, institutions etc. provide causes; since these causes 
may change over time so do the alleged laws. 
The problem of historical specificity in the writings of German Historical School 
economists is entangled with the pervading empiricist claim of all historical data being the 
only source of truth: Roscher declares economics a purely empirical science46. Latter 
statement is also a cause for the very demise of German Historical School; it is not possible 
to exclude concepts and theories from the professed purely empirical science. In the 
Methodenstreit Menger clearly identifies in a series of contestations with Schmoller the 
shortcomings: Among other objections he argues that empirical data as the source for 
knowledge leads to an internally inconsistent methodology since it relies on (non 
empirical) taxonomic assumptions that even allow induction in the first place47. It is the 
necessary uniformity and measurability that goes unmentioned by the writers of the 
Historical School. The Younger Historical School in return partly recognizes a role for 
deduction; however it continues to stress the method of induction as well as factual 
description. 
 
                                                 
44 MEYER (2002), p214 
45 Comp. with the destinction between a priori and a posteriori e.g. in: IMMANUEL KANT, Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft 1, Suhrkamp 1974, p45 
46 WILHELM ROSCHER, Der gegenwärtige Zustand der wissenschaftlichen Nationalökonomie und die 
nothwendige Reform desselben, (Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift, 1849, N° 1), p186 
47 MENGER CARL, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie 
insbesondere, Duncker & Humblot 1883,  p260 
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1.2.3 Marxism 
 
Marx criticizes the classical precursors on basis of their universal and ahistorical 
assumptions (abstract individual, dogmas). His methods in Kapital particularly stress 
historical interpretations and sociological description. Marxism perceives political economy 
as a historical science since it is constantly subjected to change, and stresses the importance 
of real premises which also can be verified in a purely empirical way. Hence Marxism 
acknowledges the importance of a dynamic inquiry in contrast to the static notions of 
classical utility theory; 48 Marxism also values an inquiry which pays attention to historical 
specificities. At first the scientist is bound to seek out laws that are valid for their respective 
period (which is characterized by their respective relations of production and property) and 
then move on to finding laws which are of a more general nature. 
Marxism departs from the Idealism of Hegel: the spirit/ideas are no longer the propelling 
force behind the unfolding of history, but socioeconomic discrepancies which result in a 
continuing class struggle. The material conditions of life (i.e. the individuals’ social 
existence) precipitate change, and no longer the individual itself.  This also amounts to a 
statement of methodological holism, since Marxist explanations now rest on the social 
structure instead of the individual. Those socially constructed individuals within a defining 
institutional setting further lead to a process of social change, which can be delineated. The 
theory of socio-economic change characterizes different socio-economic systems also only 
by their respective relations of production and property relations. Capitalism is in this 
manner regarded in reference to its main exponent of production: the capitalist firm - 
characterized by privately owned means of production and the fact that all products are the 
property of the owners and are sold for profit. History is hence nothing more than the 
succession of one distinctly different economic system after the other (ultimately evolving 
to communism).  
Again albeit an appeal for historically “real” data Marx makes explicit use of trans- and 
ahistorical concepts49. It is impossible to conceive the notion of a particular socio economic 
                                                 
48 KARL MARX, Das Kapital, in: Karl Marx - Friedrich Engels – Werke, Bd. I, Band 23, Dietz 1968, Kapitel 
22, Fußnote 63 
49 E.g. “Mode of production”, “use value” even “labour” are taken as universals HODGSON (2001) p.50 
 23
system without the use of general, taxonomic concepts; this however is denied in the 
methodology of Marx.  
 
1.2.4 Marginalism 
 
While Walras’ ideas are of influence not until the dawn of World War 2, Marshall and the 
Cambridge School of Marginalism prove of decisive capacity to change economic theory 
away from empiricism. With his Principles of Economics he is founder of what has been 
since known as neoclassical economics. 
Independently from Marshall, Menger founds in his dispute with Schmoller 
(inadvertently) what has been called by his opponent mockingly the “Austrian School”. In 
Methodenstreit where Menger makes a stand against the inductivist practice, he proves 
doctrines of Historical School wrong: description and facts are unable to explain economic 
phenomena without the use of taxonomic concepts. He also advocates the finding of 
universal laws concerning economic phenomena. Menger wants to reform a tradition 
which, in his conception had reached a dead end.  
Menger propagates a science which deals no longer with economic processes or systems 
and leads the way for economics as a science of choice. Menger’s essentialist approach re-
elects the individual as the most fundamental unit in economics; of all motives self interest 
is of the most dominating influence, especially for the field of economics. Socio economic 
structures and institutions are solely based on the interaction of individuals and shall be 
explained solely by them. He rejects Hegelian “spirit” notions that could be used on the 
emergence of social institutions in favor of an individualist evolution: an institution can be 
a result of the intended or unintended interaction of individuals. In this manner he also 
rejects economics as interpreted by German Historical School; instead of a direct 
expression of the life of a nation, it is rather the result of the interplay of all individuals 
involved and has to be analyzed as such. Contrary to his predecessors he strongly 
encourages universal laws – which, at specific times assume specific values. 
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2. The Leisure Class and Veblen’s Approach to Economics 
 
2.1 Evolutionary Economics: an Introduction 
 
In the 1898 essay “Why is Economics not an evolutionary science” Thorstein Veblen hints 
the possibility of a methodologically different approach to economic theory - in magnitude 
equal to the ascending Marginalism; it would later primarily be assembled on an implicit 
level in his opus magnum, The Theory of the Leisure Class. In his belief economics is no 
longer apt to qualify as a modern Science due to its inability to incorporate concepts of 
evolution. A broad range of influences might have inspired the application of evolutionary 
principles50. While Alfred Marshall only acknowledges the importance of the latter and 
does not pursue the application of (any) evolutionary theory, Veblen chooses to do so on 
grounds of other sciences successfully complying with those principles: 
 
It may be taken as the consensus of those men who are doing the serious work of modern 
anthropology, ethnology, and psychology, as well as of those in the biological sciences proper, that 
economics is helplessly behind the times, and unable to handle its subject-matter in a way to 
entitle it to standing as a modern science.51 
 
                                                 
50 At Yale University he came into contact with William Graham Sumner who advocated Spencerian ideas of 
evolution to the social sciences; when he was a student at Carlton College Veblen also frequently read 
Spencer. 
When Veblen took teaching a post at the University of Chicago in 1892 and stayed for 15 years, it was there 
where he met acclaimed biologist Jacques Loeb who might have inspired reoccurring notions about a true 
modern science being evolutionary. It was also during this time when Veblen publicised his most important 
works. He had been introduced to the works of William James, who like former teacher Charles Sanders 
Peirce favoured Darwin to Spencer.  
Dorfman/Hodgson also identified the influence of C. Lloyd Morgan: He primarily proposed an evolution of 
social environment to solve the problem of the rapid progression of man in the last centuries - which 
Darwinism could not account for; the phylogenetic evolution, that is the evolution in terms of genetic 
material, has been negligible in that period of time. Morgan explained this by conflating the emergent 
properties from the individual to the environment. If a group of individuals is given better health care then 
the development of the lifespan of those individuals could be improved – ontogenetically.  
 
51 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 12, No. 4 (Jul., 1898), p373 
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Main drawback of not complying with that principle is the inability to continually cite 
causal explanations to economic phenomena which ultimately reflects on the power of 
economic theories to explain. The modern scientist 
 
… wants to reduce his solution of all problems to terms of the conservation of energy or the 
persistence of quantity..52 
 
The tissue of those explanations is institutions: aptitudes and attitudes of man; i.e. Veblen 
proposes instead of the orthodox theories an informal inquiry into the evolution of those 
habits of thought: How did certain propensities evolve and how did they change in the 
course of time? Veblen believes that institutions governed the decisions of man to an 
important extent and hence takes an influence also on economic phenomena which are to 
be explained: 
 
The economic interest goes with men through life, and it goes with the race throughout its 
process of cultural development. It affects the cultural structure at all points, so that all 
institutions may be said to be in some measure economic institutions.53 
 
Their continuing influence and their dynamic nature has to be outlined in an inquiry, 
since they offer causal explanation to economic phenomena. He names this new theoretical 
approach concisely ‘Evolutionary Economics’. However Veblen rejects biological 
reductionism; culture and institutions are not explained in biological terms as the notion 
‘evolutionary’ might also suggest. 
 
An evolutionary economics must be the theory of a process of cultural growth as determined by 
the economic interest, a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in terms 
of the process itself54.  
 
                                                 
52 VEBLEN (1898), p377 
53 VEBLEN (1898), p392 
54 VEBLEN (1898), p394 
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The informal and counterteleological nature of Veblen’s evolutionary account entails 
detailed depiction of all the time specific institutional phenomena involved55: i.e. it relies 
on extensive description and facts in favor of abstract mathematical deductions, while 
aware of the dangers of seemingly pure inductive reasoning. 56. 
 
It is doubtable to formulate a generally valid “essence” of Evolutionary Economics or 
Institutionalism; however the approach by Veblen can concisely be characterized by the 
following aspects: 
 
1) Focus on institutions and their influence upon economic decisions 
2) Informality and inductive ‘storytelling’ 
3) Avoidance of reductionism 
4) Emphasis on causal explanations 
 
2.2 Problem Situation II: Critique of Economic Ideas  
 
The evolutionary approach of Veblen is highly characterized by his problem situation and 
by the positions of economic theory he rejects. While the overtly deductive, formal and 
highly teleological positions of (Neo)Classicism fall short of being an evolutionary science 
on a number of accounts, the informal approaches of Marxism and the Historical School 
are regarded far more favorably, both relying on a (more) dynamic approach of inductive 
inference. In his writings Veblen frequently makes the distinction between the following 
schools of thought: 
 
Marxism 
Austrian School of Marginalism (Menger & Böhm-Bawerk) 
                                                 
55 This has frequently been labelled as “storytelling”. BENJAMIN WARD, Sind die Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
am Ende, Belser 1976, Kapitel XII  
56 “Causal sequence…is of course a matter of metaphysical imputation. It is not a fact of observation, and 
cannot be asserted of the facts of observation except as a trait imputed to them. It is so imputed, by scientists 
and others, as a matter of logical necessity, as a basis of systematic knowledge of the facts of observation” : 
VEBLEN THORSTEIN, The Evolution of the Scientific Point of View, in:  The University of California 
Chronicle, vol. 10, No. 4 (1908), p32 
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Classical Economics (Alfred Marshall, John Bates Clark and Cairnes, Mill, Smith) 
German Historical School (Roscher, Knies, Hildebrand, Schmoller, Sombart) 
 
While Marxism, the Historical School and Marginalism provide explanations of the 
changing order of institutional setups, Classicism refuses to do so and explains in Veblen’s 
opinion only on a static basis; corresponding explanations do only entail institutions taken 
for granted  - i.e. the explanation stops at a certain level. The schools of Classicism and 
Marginalism find themselves in strong criticism for applying a taxonomic scheme, in which 
all economic phenomena are to be fitted in; they maintain a very doubtable relationship to 
causation – reducing economic phenomena to a set of preconceptions on a basic level; 
thereby they are unable to explain the true causes of economic phenomena. The 
importance of institutions in economic explanations by Marxism has been highly stressed 
due to its Collectivist credo; however Classicism and Marginalism refuse to do so in favor 
of methodological Individualism. Veblen does not state exactly what concerns the position 
of the Historical School regarding institutions in the explanations but almost certainly they 
will not be underrepresented. 
In all contemporary economic schools Veblen criticizes the existence of so called trends - 
whether it is, in position of the Historical School and Marxism the imputation of Hegelian 
Materialism, or the taxonomic nature of Marginalism and Classicism; these illustrate 
preconceptions by the scientist and impede the search for an (ultimate) explanation. 
Explanatory power is enhanced by getting rid of preconceptions in search of the underlying 
causal mechanism of an economic phenomenon. 
By containing explanations void of evolutionary thought, Veblen criticizes the missing 
cumulative order in the explanations of all economic theories with exception of the 
Younger Historical School. 
Finally the model of man is criticized of Classicism and Marginalism; no clear statements 
are made as to the decision models of Marxism and the Historical School. 
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Historical 
School 
Marxism Classicism Marginalism 
Explanation of 
Change 
Dynamic Dynamic Static; Teleology  
Evolutionary  
Account 
No/Yes No No No 
Preconceptions 
Hegelian 
Materialim 
Hegelian 
Materialism 
Universal Laws, 
Taxonomy, hypothetico -
deductive model 
Universal Laws, 
Taxonomy, hypothetico -
deductive model 
Institutions as 
elements of an 
explanation 
Emphasis 
Overemphasis 
(Collectivism) 
Neglection/Under-
emphasis 
(Meth. Individualism) 
Underemphasis (Meth. 
Individualism) 
Model of man   Hedonism/Rationality Hedonism/Rationality 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Marxism 
 
Marxism with its focus on social and economic change was of molding influence for the 
development of Veblen’s institutional approach to economics. In a seminal book review of 
1897 (Max Lorentz - “Die Marxistische Socialdemokratie”) Veblen conjointly with the 
author points out defects of Marxism and suggests an amendment57. The paragraph already 
contains much of the innovations of Veblenite thought. 
 
While the materialistic interpretation of history points out how social development goes on – by 
a class struggle that proceeds from maladjustment between economic structure and economic 
function – it is nowhere pointed out what is the operative force at work in the process. It denies 
                                                 
57 HODGSON (2004), p131 
Table 1: Adopted explanatory concepts in 
Economic theories 
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that human discretion and effort seeking a better adjustment can furnish such a force, since it 
makes man the creature of circumstances. This defect reduces itself ... to a misconception of 
human nature and of man’s place in the social development. The materialistic theory conceives 
of man as exclusively a social being, who counts in the process solely as a medium for the 
transmission and expression of social laws and changes; whereas he is, in fact, also an 
individual, acting out his own life as such. Hereby is indicated not only the weakness of the 
materialistic theory, but also the means of remedying the defect pointed out. With the 
amendment so indicated, it becomes not only a theory of the method of social and economic 
change, but a theory of social process considered as a substantial unfolding of life as well.58 
 
Veblen criticizes the holistic overemphasis on structure asserting that class position does 
not automatically determine the actions and habits of thought of an individual59 (both 
capitalist and worker); an individual has the power to act on his own. Neither on the other 
hand is the individual the exclusive entity of explanation – Veblen does not sanction 
methodological individualism as the potential cure. In contrast to Marxism Veblen 
contrived man as not exclusively being molded by his socio-economic surroundings but 
rather as a social being with own (individual) aims. The individual may act on behalf of 
structure but has it within its power to change and form the latter. While Veblen does 
praise the “method of change” (in contrast to classical approaches which he perceived 
static) he further remarks that Marxism fails in outlaying the origin of the individual’s 
capacity. The evolution of individuality should be subject to an explanation itself. 
Furthermore, despite the undisputed importance of structure, Marxism lacks an answer as 
to what is the “operative force” at work – how do structures i.e. institutions affect the 
individual?  
In a later formulated, more explicit critique of the Marxian System, Veblen comments on 
the causal structure. Due to the impeding influence of Hegelianism an explanation in 
Marxian terms comes to a sudden halt. 
 
                                                 
58 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, Review of Max Lorentz: Die Marxistische Socialdemocratie, The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 6, No. 1. (Dec., 1897) , p136 
59 There is, no warrant for asserting a priori that the class interest of the working class will bring workers to 
take a stand against the propertied class. 
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The romantic (Marxian) sequence of theory is essentially an intellectual sequence, and it is 
therefore of a teleological character. The logical trend of it can be argued out. That is to say, it 
tends to a goal. It must eventuate in a consummation, a final term. On the other hand, in the 
Darwinian scheme of thought, the continuity sought in and imputed to the facts is a continuity 
of cause and effect.60 
 
For Veblen the so called Materialistic Conception of History is at the heart of the 
argument: Deriving from Hegelian orthodoxy in the Marxian system, material exigencies 
determine man’s spiritual life61 – his thoughts. The struggle for self realization of the spirit 
in the Hegelian system becomes the class struggle in the Marxian system. A steady state as 
in “realization of the human spirit” however is overtly in opposition to the principle of 
causation; historical materialism is hence discarded by Veblen. Evolutionary Economics 
admits no final trend since every seemingly stable state (or final term) can and has to be 
explained in terms of institutions and habits of thought involved – the latter of which will 
lead to a new set of institutions under new circumstances. Veblen breaks with the 
metaphysical influence of Hegelianism in economics arguing strictly in favor of a method 
of cumulative causation.  
In sum Veblen dissents with Marxism on the structure/agency problem and the un-
scientific explanations originating in the application of Hegelianism. However Marxism 
also provides the very key stimulus to the institution focus of Veblenite Institutionalism: 
Institutions have the power to influence economic decisions of man, although they do not 
exclusively decide his fate. An explanation proper should take this into consideration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 THORSTEIN VEBLEN,  The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers II, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Feb., 1907), p304 
61 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers I, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Aug., 1906), p580 
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2.2.2 German Historical School 
 
Veblen was in a similar manner highly influenced by the fact insistent detailed inquiries of 
the historical school the latter of which bear a certain resemblance to the economic essays 
of Institutionalism. Veblen valued their work greatly, due to the informal, institution 
sensitive and dynamic analysis, but within limits of a non-evolutionary approach.  
 
…no economics is farther from being an evolutionary science than the received economics of the 
Historical School. The whole broad range of erudition and research that engage the energies of 
that school commonly falls short of being science, in that, when consistent, they have contented 
themselves with an enumeration of data and a narrative account of industrial development, and 
have not presumed to offer a theory of anything or to elaborate their results into a consistent 
body of knowledge.62 
 
In the reviews and essays of Veblen German historical school is frequently being 
confronted with the reproach of not having adhered to a “closely knit body of knowledge”, 
whereby Veblen means its inability to explain in accordance with evolutionary theory. 
While the historical school maintains also an approach to economics that holds socio-
economic change in high esteem it fails in terms of Darwinist internal continuity – which 
is able to gradually interlink institutions and habits of thought over the course of time, one 
leading to the other. Veblen accuses them of having given a “narrative survey of 
phenomena, not a genetic account of an unfolding process”.63 
Between the writings he distinguishes two different branches: the younger (Schmoller), and 
the elder (Wagner) While he sympathized with the former, he harshly criticized the latter 
for lack of theory proper: 
 
It is work of a sufficiently important and valuable order, perhaps it is indispensable to the task 
which the science has in hand, but, broadly speaking, it need not be counted with in so far as it 
touches directly upon economic theory. This elder line of German economics, in its numerous 
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modern representatives, shows both insight and impartiality; but as regards economic theory 
their work bears the character of eclecticism rather than that of a constructive advance.64 
 
Veblen mostly finds fault in Roscher’s adopted Hegelian notions of the (human) “spiritual 
unfolding”: In Roscher’s ideas the life process is an active, self determining process; the 
course of culture is an exfoliation of the human spirit; economics has to outline the laws of 
this cultural unfolding with regard to economic exigencies. The history of cultural growth 
repeats itself, since it is always the same human spirit that seeks realization; economics 
grasps the historical uniformities in the sequence of phenomena. Despite similarities to 
Darwinist concepts of evolution (the so called historicist “process of cultural development” 
of which economic inquiry is supposed to determine the laws of), the true causes at work 
will thereby not be revealed. Veblen is aware that the conception of the historical school 
makes use of development and evolution, but the Hegelianism present both in Marxism 
(the ultimate trend to a class struggle) and the historical school (spiritual unfolding), 
contains grave preconceptions impeding a method of cumulative causation. In Schmollers 
(late) work however the very Hegelian bias is absent. Historical investigations examine the 
various causal relationships that take an influence on economic agents and activities; 
Schmoller inquires as to cause and effect - this makes an impression on Veblen: 
 
“For the distinguishing characteristic of Professor Schmoller's work, that wherein it differs from 
the earlier work of the economists of his general class, is that it aims at a Darwinistic account of 
the origin, growth, persistence, and variation of institutions, in so far as these institutions have 
to do with the economic aspect of life either as cause or as effect.”65 
 
Criticism of Schmoller’s approach stems from the stipulated use of normative social 
guidelines, suggesting certain institutions as more apt for society than others66. On account 
of its causal analysis of the historical details involved “in the shaping of economic activities 
and aims” Schmoller’s “Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre” nevertheless is 
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(Nov., 1901), p71 
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reviewed highly favorable by Veblen. Sombart’s “Der moderne Kapitalismus” is even labeled 
as “the most considerable essay in economic theory yet made on lines independent of the 
classical English political economy”. 
 
2.2.3 Classicism, Marginalism 
 
Veblen maintains a starkly dissenting attitude to all literature of the classical branch, 
formulating a broad range of criticism. He distinguishes the Marginalists from the English 
classical economists by being a more refined derivative, constantly adhering to common 
postulates. Veblen put himself deliberately in contrast to the emanating schools of 
Marginalism.  
In Veblen’s opinion a pervading aspect traverses all economic theories from the early 
Physiocratism to Adam Smith over to Mill and Cairnes and Marshall; he criticizes their use 
of stipulated concepts of preconception combined with a taxonomic impulse, trying to file 
economic phenomena accordingly. Features that do not lend themselves to an 
interpretation in that respect, are classified as disturbing causes and not pursued any 
further. Veblen’s Criticism stems mostly from the use of universal laws, so called “natural 
laws” (as in natural wage, unseen hand, equilibrium). In his opinion these laws stand in 
stark contrast to pure cumulative causation, since they are mere imputations of a 
preconceived reality. So called tendencies are also based on preconceived notions of a 
definitive end, or as to what might constitute a legitimate trend. This also implies a direct 
critique of the hypothetico-deductive model of science, since its a priori character results in 
a method of causal inference which after authentication via induction discards any cases 
that do not lend themselves to the interpretation of the tested formula in 
question.67Explanations of this type cannot explain the causes of economic phenomena 
without preconceptions or taxonomy considerations; in favor of internal consistence and 
irrefutability, explanatory power is limited. 
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The outcome of the method, at its best, is a body of logically consistent propositions concerning 
the normal relations of things - a system of economic taxonomy. At its worst, it is a body of 
maxims for the conduct of business and a polemical discussion of disputed points of policy.68  
 
The common model of man of the rational hedonistic individual, where human conduct is 
interpreted as a rational response to a situation, is discarded as a “faulty conception” of 
man. Neoclassical choice theory sees all individuals equally on a level of a whole, 
standardized machine that is able to farsightedly anticipate future pain and pleasure with 
painstaking scrutiny. Veblen is well aware of the advantages a certain model brings (“how 
adequate it may be”) but purposefully discards its use.  
 
The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who 
oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift 
him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an 
isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging 
forces that displace him in one direction or another.69 
 
In Veblen’s opinion the model of man being a simple bundle of desires is no longer up to 
date with the latest results in the field of psychology and anthropology. Man is governed 
by his habits and instincts, which makes him a prime mover who does not simply suffer 
pleasure or pain in subjection to external forces; human activity is not incidental to the 
saturation of given desires.  
 
Under the Darwinian norm it must be held that men's reasoning is largely controlled by other 
than logical, intellectual forces. …that … sentiment which animates men, singly or collectively, 
is as much, or more, an outcome of habit and native propensity as of calculated material 
interest.70 
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The cultural elements of the classical economic theory are not subject to an inquiry: 
Classicism by its methodological individualist method does not include structure in its 
explanations or gives institutions the power to be an entity of ultimate explanation; 
institutions are accepted as the nature of things. If they are included in the premises, they 
are merely included as postulates a priori. (e.g. ownership, hedonistic calculus); 
consequences and effects are not being accounted for. Since however in the ideas of Veblen 
they do condition human conduct (as has been demonstrated by Marxism), cumulative 
causation requires them to be explained.  
 
It is characteristic of the school that wherever an element of the cultural fabric, an institution or 
any institutional phenomenon, is involved in the facts with which the theory is occupied, such 
institutional facts are taken for granted, denied, or explained away. 71 
 
An inquiry into the details of institutional setups involves a dynamic approach; Smith and 
the English Classical Economists did pursue an approach of developmental, processual 
relation (and are therefore held in high esteem72) On the other hand the Marginal School 
did not engage in a theory of growth but only in a “static” endeavor. 
 
It offers no theory of a movement of any kind, being occupied with the adjustment of values to a 
given situation73.  
 
The Austrian School of Marginalism is mostly regarded with the same disapproval as the 
economics of Marshall and Clark; both being confined by a very narrow (“faulty”) 
conception of the human reasoning. However despite its taxonomic nature, Veblen values 
the processual and informal inquiry into the underlying causes.  
 
…the Austrians and their precursors and their coadjutors in the value discussion have taken up 
a detached portion of economic theory, and have inquired with great nicety into the process by 
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which the phenomena within their limited field are worked out. The entire discussion of 
marginal utility and subjective value as the outcome of a valuation process must be taken as a 
genetic study of this range of facts.74 
 
2.3 The Power of Veblenian Institutionalism  
 
The fact that the contribution of Veblen been summarized differently and with different 
emphases by various authors reflects the fact that the core notions of Evolutionary 
Economics highly depend on each other and are hardly able to stand on their own as 
methodological positions; an analysis of the power of Veblenite Institutionalism is even 
complicated by the fact that Veblen himself does not formulate a clear cut methodology or 
metatheory. All of the methodological positions presented here are apparent in Theory of 
the Leisure Class and take reference to both preceding economic theories and the 
fundamental problems in the background; however they are all interconnected to some 
extent. The new solutions to the problems eventually entail the augmentation of a theory’s 
explanatory power.  
 
DECISION MODELING gives an alternative answer as to what constitute fundamental 
motivations for (economic) decisions of man. CUMULATIVE CAUSATION comments 
on a frequent misconception which has been unveiled not only as a result of 
Methodenstreit: Basic taxonomy precedes economic theory - historical specificities favor a 
dynamic and informal causal account. DARWINISM provides the introduction of 
Darwinist ideas on an institutional level to the field of economics. REJECTION OF 
METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM comments on the 
question as to what unit constitutes the fundamental unit of explanation in economics. 
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2.3.1 Decision Modeling 
 
Problem:   How can decisions of man be modeled? 
Preceding solution: rational (hedonist) individual 
New solution:   habit/institution-dominated individual 
 
Classicism makes universal use of the „economic man“- conception as a “lightning 
calculator of pleasure and pain”75; it assumes an individual which is directed solely towards 
the acquisition of pecuniary assets; the hedonistic Benthemite individual is not altered by 
specific philosophical beliefs, cultural norms and values.  Neoclassicism adopts the 
rationality principle: an agent chooses of a number of alternatives in accordance with a 
preference ordering (transitive, complete), subject to perfect information, maximizing his 
utility. Neoclassical compositions under the banner of rationality can practically be made 
to fit any possible behavior and hence can hardly be refuted – they amount to an analytical 
tautology: everyone maximizes utility because whatever they choose exhibits the utility they 
maximize76. The apperception of man in Neoclassicism is far from reality: Man does 
indeed make choices that are far from a perfectly foresighted rational deliberation of 
possible alternatives77. Therefore Veblen accuses them of using an inapt model both in 
terms of recent psychology and anthropology which no longer conforms to the standard of 
actual knowledge78; the limits of such a theory are grave; explanatory power is confined to a 
narrow cordon. 
 
Such a theory can take account of conduct only in so far as it is rational conduct, guided by 
deliberate and exhaustively intelligent choice-wise adaptation to the demands of the main 
chance79.  
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Veblen in turn proposes a habit and instinct dominated model of man: 19th century 
Pragmatism has proven intelligent conduct as the result of habit instead of instantaneous, 
“rational”, insight: habits act as filters in accordance with past experiences.80 Habits are not 
applied consciously, they come before reason.  Reason only acts as a judge between 
habitual measures and intervenes in resulting cognitive conflicts – a resulting pattern if 
successfully enacted, consequently manifests as another habit. Veblen argues here in favour 
of a model of man which does not oversimplify but rather does explain the origin of 
agents’ decisions in accordance with the ideas of Pragmatism. On the most fundamental 
level man is driven by his instincts81: 
 
…that instinct [the instinct of workmanship] is the court of final appeal in any question of 
economic truth or adequacy 82 
 
By the subsequent influence of institutions upon the individual, habits and beliefs emerge. 
For example the institution of ownership might at its genesis inspire new forms of human 
action in order to continually satisfy basic instincts; habits are hence similar to instincts – 
they impose a certain propensity to the individual as a means to an instinctive end 83. 
Habits however have to be sanctioned by selective adaptation: only successful behavior will 
be admitted and subsequently passed on.  
 
In general, the longer the habituation, the more unbroken the habit, and the more nearly it 
coincides with previous habitual forms of the life process, the more persistently will the given 
habit assert itself.84 
 
In Theory of the Leisure Class the emergence of these habits is traced over the course of the 
centuries as it continually changes its form due to the altering cultural conditions: Under 
new regimes of thought – peaceable phases, industrialization, the feudal era – different 
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solutions prevail that satisfy basic human needs. In this manner the model of the habitual 
(institution caused) motivations of human decisions is also dynamic and cannot rely on a 
fixed set of habitual propensities. The search for conduct for the individual in a changing 
environment is a dynamic process. 
 
With the advent of the predatory stage of life there comes a change in the requirements of the 
successful human character. Men’s habits of life are required to adapt themselves to new 
exigencies under a new scheme of human relations.85 
 
And on the other hand, whenever an accession of pecuniary strength puts the individual in a 
position to unfold his life process in larger scope and with additional reach, the ancient 
propensities of the race will assert themselves in determining the direction which the new 
unfolding of life is to take.86 
 
From this dynamic departure Veblen makes a further addition: some habits that have been 
adopted a certain timespan ago and then due to an institutional change have been then 
without application, do not necessarily have to be selectively eliminated. They can be 
passed on to consecutive generations of man and can re-emerge (that is if the individual 
benefits from it in the attainment of his instinctive goals). 
 
… habits of life are of too pervading a character to be ascribed to the influence of a late or brief 
discipline. The ease with which they are temporarily overborne by the special exigencies of recent 
and modern life argues that these habits are the surviving effects of a discipline of extremely 
ancient date, from the teachings of which men have frequently been constrained to depart in 
detail under the altered circumstances of a later time; and the almost ubiquitous fashion in 
which they assert themselves whenever the pressure of special exigencies is relieved, argues that the 
process by which the traits were fixed and incorporated into the spiritual make-up of the type 
must have lasted for a relatively very long time and without serious intermission. 
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Veblen’s portrayal of the institution of ownership and private property might serve as an 
example of the habit/institution dominated model: On the possible consumption of a good 
the neoclassical rational individual would contemplate by evaluating the future 
increase/decrease in the comforts of life: 
 
It has not been unusual for economic theory to speak of the […] struggle for wealth […] as a 
competition for an increase of the comforts of life,—primarily for an increase of the physical 
comforts which the consumption of goods affords.87 
 
Veblen however sees the propensity for emulation i.e. the habit of invidious distinction as 
the most important factor taking an influence on consumption decisions in preindustrial 
societies88. If an agent buys a certain good than it is not due to an act of meticulously exact 
calculation regarding future gains and losses in comfort but due to the fact that he reacts 
instinctively to his propensity to emulate (which in turn is rooted in the instinct of 
workmanship89) and the historically specific fact that possession confers honor90. In 
Veblen’s opinion it is also emulation that is at the root of most present considerations of 
consumption – the habit has been passed on to further generations and has prevailed.  
 
The motive that lies at the root of ownership is emulation; and the same motive of emulation 
continues active in the further development of the institution to which it has given rise and in 
the development of all those features of the social structure which this institution of ownership 
touches.91 
 
The causes of economic choices in Veblen’s model of human action - the habits and 
institutions that govern the decisions of man, are of fundamental importance to Veblen 
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and his idea of Evolutionary Economics. The ideas that are advocated by his reasoning are 
in contrast to both traditional concepts of economic decision modeling. The “economic 
man” knew his limits at the very inauguration, exhibiting a very narrow scope of mind; the 
model of man in neoclassicism in a similar manner works by letting man rationally 
contemplate on the outcomes of his actions, valuing them in terms of their utility and then 
deciding appropriately. Because of its contrast to reality Veblenite Institutionalism exhibits 
a model that emphasizes the importance of instincts and habits in economics in order to 
explain agents’ decisions and mindset.  
 
2.3.2 Cumulative Causation 
 
Problems:   How can a causal relationship be inferred? 
Are historical specificities relevant? 
Preceding solution: basic preconceptions/hypothetico-deductive model 
static/dynamic approach 
New solution:   method of cumulative causation 
 
Classicism and Marginalism are static approaches to economics in the sense that they look 
for universal laws that can be uncovered and made use of without regarding the specificities 
of time and place. Major disadvantage is their narrow scope of reality and the 
informational content thereof which is impeded by the quest for taxonomic universality. 
Resulting explanations are therefore of small explanatory value. The Historical School on 
the other hand decidedly acknowledges that different economic phases and settings require 
a detached analysis - sensitive with respect to the specificities; as a result it pursues a 
narrative, fact-insistent account, observing the various institutions that shape economic 
phenomena over the course of time. Its explanatory power from begin with is higher, the 
explanations filled with more informational content. Veblen intently follows into the 
footsteps of the latter, challenging the applicability of universal laws in economics and the 
sensibility of a taxonomic approach and also pursues an informal inquiry stressing the 
cumulative sequence of economic institutions. Veblen identifies the remaining drawback of 
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the Historical School in turn in its inconsistent body: The problem lies in its inability to 
yield to an evolutionary conception of the narrative account. 
Both contemporary theories possess their respective detriments that limit explanatory 
power; Veblen conceives the method of cumulative causation as a solution which is able to 
bring forth more realistic explanations, explaining the interdependencies between 
economic entities and respective phenomena.  
The historical school already possesses many of the traits required of an evolutionary 
economics. It is by far the economic school that took the most influence on the genesis of 
Institutionalism. Veblen’s harshest criticism stems from the diametrically opposed theories, 
which are seemingly static, deductive, taxonomic and teleological. Most importantly and in 
stark contrast to those theories, the historical school ventures explicitly on an economics of 
process92, on an inquiry of the continuing change in human institutions. However a theory 
of economics can ask questions as to the nature of change and at the same time be an 
inorganic science; dealing with matters of development and process does not make a 
science evolutionary; fact insistence alone is similarly not able to warrant the title. 
 
The difference is a difference of spiritual attitude or point of view in the two contrasted 
generations of scientists. To put the matter in other words, it is a difference in the basis of 
valuation of the facts for the scientific purpose, or in the interest from which the facts are 
appreciated93.  
 
The older historical school94 makes use of Hegelian notions of an exfoliation of human 
spirit that manifests itself in the sequence of culture; thereby it imputes a certain 
preconception and does not work scientifically.  
 
Inquiry into the cultural development under the guidance of such preconceptions as these has led 
to generalizations, more or less arbitrary, regarding uniformities of sequence in phenomena, 
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while the causes which determine the course of events and which make the uniformity or 
variation of the sequence have received but scant attention.95  
 
The universal (natural) laws of classicism and their adherents also amount to a series of 
preconceptions. The formulation of any “natural” law must precede a metatheoretical 
taxonomy as to what end things tend. In the same manner the hypothetico-deductive 
method only regards an (abstract) normalized scheme, which is to be tested inductively 
only in accordance to the latter. The resulting theory is biased and does not inquire with 
respect to cause and effect. 
 
In effect, this preconception imputes to things a tendency to work out what the instructed 
common sense of the time accepts as the adequate or worthy end of human effort. It is a 
projection of the accepted ideal of conduct.96 
 
Classical enquiries in comparison to the historical approach do most times not adhere to a 
processual inquiry; the marginal theories are even by credo static inceptions into taxonomic 
model proper. How do people acquire beliefs? How do institutions emerge and take an 
influence on the individual? Neoclassicism side steps the problems by assuming given 
preferences and letting the economic man act rationally – when he makes a decision he acts 
in accordance with the axioms of utility theory, maximizing the respective utility function. 
Neoclassical compositions under the banner of rationality can practically be made to fit 
any possible behavior but lack the capacity to explain economic behavior and phenomena 
beyond a certain scope. Marginalism cannot give an answer to the question as to what are 
the causes of preferences. Class positions in Marxism similarly do not assign causes and 
motivations to individual actions. 
 
So the institution […] is taken into the inquiry not as a factor of growth or an element subject 
to change, but as one of the primordial and immutable facts of the order of nature, underlying 
the hedonistic calculus. […] There is no thought either of a conceivable growth of this definitive 
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nineteenth-century institution out of a cruder past or of any conceivable cumulative change in 
the scope and force of ownership in the present or future. Nor is it conceived that the presence of 
this institutional element in men's economic relations in any degree affects or disguises the 
hedonistic calculus, or that its pecuniary conceptions and standards in any degree standardize, 
color, mitigate, or divert the hedonistic calculator from the direct and unhampered quest of the 
net sensuous gain. .97 
 
Veblen argues in favor of a model that solves this series of problems, not oversimplifying 
and at the same time explaining the origin of agents’ decisions; even if the model of man 
constantly in pursuit of wealth was true it had to be explained properly (How did the 
propensity emerge?); since man is subject to an evolutionary process, preferences can in no 
case be taken as given but have to be unveiled in terms of causal account; everything else 
(preconceptions!) puts a limit to the explanatory power of a scientific system. 
 
The modern scientist is unwilling to depart from the test of causal relation or quantitative 
sequence. When he asks the question, Why? He insists on an answer in terms of cause and effect. 
He wants to reduce his solution of all problems to terms of the conservation of energy or the 
persistence of quantity.98 
 
Veblen requests an account of the pure process of cumulative causation, void of any 
preconceived notions, taxonomies or ad hoc assumptions. To grasp the persisting force of 
the changing economic institutions in question the scientist finds its ultimate unit of 
regress in the terms of how individuals acquire their habits of thought. What regards 
neoclassical preference functions, only a static disclosure of all influence would be 
insufficient. Hence this does automatically favor a dynamic approach, since  
 
The active material in which the economic process goes on is the human material of the 
industrial community. For the purpose of economic science the process of cumulative change that 
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is to be accounted for is the sequence of change in the methods of doing things, the methods of 
dealing with the material means of life.99  
 
Cumulative causation as a mode of explanation means a narrative, informal method, 
outlining over the course of time the changing habits of thought that mould economic 
dispositions with respect to cause and effect. Such an inquiry involves institutions since 
they take a decisive influence on the individual. Assumptions concerning man have to be 
in accordance with Darwinism and human evolution; this entails the demand that any 
traits attributed have to be dynamic and consistent with natural selection of traits and 
institutions100.  
 
In Theory of the Leisure Class Veblen gives causal explanations both of individual agency 
and of emergent phenomena – i.e. institutions; both are equally involved with the leisure 
class but neither entity directly possesses explanatory supremacy. The concept of 
cumulative causation cannot take any specific temporal disposition of man for granted but 
the very inherent. On an individual level this includes finding a way from the most 
fundamental unit - his instincts, to the resulting propensities that emerge over time as a 
result of institutional constraints. Institutions in the same manner are subjected to the 
detailed inquiry of cumulative causation from their very roots involving simple archaic 
cultures. One of the ultimate decision which this detailed account of underlying causes and 
habits in this respect aims for, regards the present day consumer who faces a difficult 
choice: Buying trinkets of small practical value displaying a high amount of conspicuous 
expenditure in favor of essential goods for the daily need. Hence an account of all 
individuals and institutions involved has been given; effects and interconnections between 
further institutions have been lain out for view as far as the economic sphere is concerned. 
Again Veblen’s portrayal of the institution of property/ownership might serve as an 
example: While Classicism makes use of a static concept, Veblen stressed a dynamic order, 
which admits different definitions of institutions in different phases of history paying 
attention to specificities: 
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It has been customary in economic theory, and especially among those economists who adhere 
with least faltering to the body of modernised classical doctrines, to construe this struggle for 
wealth as being substantially a struggle for subsistence.101 
 
The struggle for wealth or the acquisition of property is only under certain specific 
conditions a struggle for subsistence. During the early phases of human development 
where communities can hardly manage to afford a livelihood despite “arduous application 
of labor”, the assertion is valid. However in later phases where emulation enters as a 
propensity to react upon102, the acquisition of property is mainly the result of an invidious 
display of honor instead of subsistence; this is also the present day form of the institution:  
Agents possess goods, in order to gain honor in the community; it dates back to archaic 
demonstrations of prowess and the concept of private property as the visual display of 
successful warfare; i.e. booty in the early predatory phases has now been replaced by other 
goods, of which ownership is associated with honor. On a habit level this involves the 
propensity for emulation, which continually manifests itself and requires certain specific 
goods in order to be satisfied.  
 
The formulation of cumulative causation is foremost the result of the preconceptions 
involved in contemporary economic theories; in getting rid of the latter, corresponding 
explanations are more unbiased, hence more realistic; it requires a dynamic and historically 
sensitive framework in order to explain cause and effect of economic phenomena. 
Marginalism also adheres to a concept that decidedly stops at a certain level of explanation. 
Given preferences impose a limit of scope on economics that could be broadened. Why 
should the economic questioning and the search for answers end at a certain point? 
Cumulative causation aims to state underlying causes of a certain disposition; resulting 
explanations built from the institutional setup of society are more precise and richer in 
informational content.  
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2.3.3 Darwinism 
 
Problem:  - 
Preceding Solution: conventional explanations 
New solution:  Darwinian explanations; cumulative causation 
 
The agenda of implementing an evolutionary method in economics is twofold; for one this 
means a cumulative method103; secondly this also entails the application of the Darwinian 
principle of natural selection. The latter ultimately is an enhancement to the principle of 
cumulative causation since it enables the scientist to include further information in his 
explanations; likewise the inclusion of Darwinist principles is neither taxonomic nor 
teleological since 
 
…the Darwinian scheme of thought, the continuity sought in and imputed to the facts is a 
continuity of cause and effect…104 
 
Darwinism involves three important aspects105: 1) variation - sustained variation (random 
or purposive) among the members of a species or population. 2) A mechanism of heredity 
or continuity – a mechanism to pass on the individual characteristics over the course of 
generations 3) the struggle for existence - better adapted individuals will survive. While 
Darwinism means selection of individuals in a fixed environment, Veblen hints that an 
environment consisting of changing institutional elements is also subject to an evolutionary 
process. The principle of evolutionary selection does not only apply to individuals and 
groups but also to institutions: they are both result of a selective and adaptive process and a 
factor furthering selection of individuals according to certain traits: 
 
The evolution of social structure has been a process of natural selection of institutions. The 
progress which has been and is being made in human institutions and in human character may 
                                                 
103 this is covered in 2.3.2. Cumulative Causation 
104 VEBLEN (1907), p304 
105 HODGSON (2004), p188 
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be set down, broadly, to a natural selection of the fittest habits of thought and to a process of 
enforced adaptation of individuals to an environment which has progressively changed with the 
growth of the community and with the changing institutions under which men have lived. 
Institutions are not only themselves the result of a selective and adaptive process which shapes the 
prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and aptitudes; they are at the same time 
special methods of life and of human relations, and are therefore in their turn efficient factors of 
selection. So that the changing institutions in their turn make for a further selection of 
individuals endowed with the fittest temperament, and a further adaptation of individual 
temperament and habits to the changing environment through the formation of new 
institutions.106 
 
Institutions are the units of selection in this process of economic evolution. They are 
passed on to subsequent generations with variations.  
 
The situation of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow through a selective, coercive process, 
by acting upon men’s habitual view of things, and so altering or fortifying a point of view or a 
mental attitude handed down from the past.107 
 
The constraining influence on the institutions is therefore not only immaterial (forces of 
nature, living conditions) but consists of the very same habits of thought.   
 
The forces which have shaped the development of human life and of social structure are no 
doubt ultimately reducible to terms of living tissue and material environment; but proximately 
for the 
purpose in hand, these forces may best be stated in terms of an environment, partly human, 
partly non-human, and a human subject with a more or less definite physical and intellectual 
constitution.108 
 
                                                 
106 VEBLEN (2007) p125 
107 VEBLEN (2007), p126 
108 VEBLEN (2007), p162 
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Only institutions i.e. habits of thought109 with respect to particular relations and particular 
functions of the individual and of the community, which are fittest and leave the 
individual with a competitive advantage, will prevail. Every habit of thought as depicted by 
the process of cumulative causation manifests itself via selective adaptation. However 
Institutions are always behind the “requirements” of the present since they are a product of 
a past process and adapted to past circumstances. The exigencies of life that make for the 
adaptation and exercise the selection find themselves in a constant process of change and 
render the latest set of acquired institutions obsolete. 
An example regarding the propensity to emulate illustrates the application: The 
explanation as to how this propensity did emerge and how it does affect economic 
institutions (e.g. ownership/property), is extended by the introduction of Darwinian 
dynamics. Veblen distinguishes two different classes of traits common to all men – 
peaceable traits and predatory traits; in Veblen’s opinion emulation only encourages the 
latter and hence tends to selectively eliminate the peaceable traits. Thus an explanation by 
cumulative causation (question: How did the institution of property come into being, and 
how does it affect society?110) introduces an additional level of content. 
 
The salient characteristic of the barbarian culture is an unremitting emulation and antagonism 
between classes and between individuals. This emulative discipline favours those individuals 
and lines of descent which possess the peaceable savage traits in a relatively slight degree. It 
therefore tends to eliminate these traits […] Where life is largely a struggle between individuals 
within the group, the possession of the ancient peaceable traits in a marked degree would 
hamper an individual in the struggle for life. 
 
The application of the Darwinian method of natural selection is not a solution to a specific 
problem in the social sciences but rather by value of its additional information a direct 
addition to the explanatory power of a theory. The notion of cumulative causation is 
greatly enhanced by the concept of a Darwinian selection of institutions. Not only might 
such an inquiry find and uncover new laws and questions but foremost it is directed 
                                                 
109 VEBLEN (2007) p126 
110 This takes reference to the similar examples in 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 
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towards the goal of systematic explanation of human behavior (under the rule of scarcity of 
resources). In a similar manner as in biology, a Darwinist explanation enhances the 
explanatory power when applied in comparison to seemingly loose, static explanations. 
 
2.3.4 Rejection of methodological individualism and collectivism  
 
Problem: What constitutes the fundamental entity of an explanation?111 
Preceding solution: method. collectivism, method. individualism 
New solution:  interdependence between institutions and individuals 
 
Methodological individualism means that every phenomenon that is to be explained, has to 
be explained in terms of the individuals involved -  the fundamental unit of explanation is 
the individual; methodological collectivism asserts the very opposite, namely that the 
explanations in question are only relying on systematic wholes – structures, institutions 
and culture. Marxian collectivism, while reducing the individual to the playball of social 
forces, grants a decisive influence to the latter – this is what the outspoken individualism of 
Menger refuses to do. Veblen at the very earliest in his Marxist book review rejects both 
doctrines in their strict application and rather acknowledges the individual’s power to 
choose, but is also well aware of the strong influence of structure.  
 
Human agency is the result of biological and social evolution – its behavior is governed by 
inherited instincts and the changing socio-cultural environment – i.e. institutions, which 
have evolved over a certain amount of time; these institutions possess most properties of 
structural constraints.  
 
The institutions – that is to say the habits of thought – under the guidance of which men live 
are in this way received from an earlier time; more or less remotely earlier, but in any event they 
have been elaborated in and received from the past.112 
                                                 
111 Formulated differently: How much influence do institutions have in the explanation of economic 
phenomena? 
This puts the entire problem to a new perspective: While collectivism maintains an overemphasis, 
methodological individualism maintains an underemphasis. 
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However an exclusive stress on the structural entity as the fundamental unit of explanation 
is in not sensible: Veblen knew that institutions were also product of individuals; 
institutions relied on individuals. Individual behavior could not be explained entirely in 
terms of social structures. 
 
The growth and mutations of the institutional fabric are an outcome of the conduct of the 
individual members of the group, since it is out of the experience of the individuals, through the 
habituation of individuals, that institutions arise; and it is in this same experience that these 
institutions act to direct and define the aims and end of conduct.113 
 
Veblen could also not adopt methodological individualism since the individual is crucially 
formed and influenced by institutions. Social structures are in turn not entirely explicable 
in terms of individuals. In Veblen’s own words 
 
… an adequate theory of economic conduct, even for statical purposes, cannot be drawn in terms 
of the individual simply as is the case with the marginal-utility economics because it cannot be 
drawn in terms of the underlying traits of human nature simply; since the response that goes to 
make up human conduct takes place under institutional norms and only under stimuli that 
have an institutional bearing; for the situation that provokes and inhibits action in any given 
case is itself in great part of institutional, cultural derivation.114 
 
As a result both entities exist simultaneously and are subject to a continuous process of 
evolution in a mutual state of dependence. No fundamental unit possesses explanatory 
supremacy over the other. Social structures depend upon individuals in their very genesis 
and existence. They have the power to destroy and uphold them (willingly and 
unwillingly) and would not exist if individuals ceased to exist. The individual on the other 
                                                                                                                                               
112 VEBLEN(2007), p126 
113 VEBLEN (1909), p629 
114 VEBLEN (1909), p629 
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hand depends upon social structure in the formulation of its economic interaction. The 
individual is as formed by institutions as he has the power to form them himself. 115 
The argument can be repeated by analysis of the Theory of the Leisure Class, which shows 
both characteristics, and both interdependent: those of explanatory fundamental 
individuals, and of explanatory fundamental structure: Theory of the Leisure Class gives the 
individual the power to have aims and interests that decisively influence socio-economic 
phenomena; human instincts are the driving force hitherto. Of the most fundamental 
instincts Veblen cites three: The instinct of workmanship - a proclivity for efficient work 
and tangible results, the parental bent - all propensities of social sympathy (compassion 
etc.), the bent of idle curiosity – a longing after the new and new knowledge especially. 
These basic instincts give, as the process of institutional evolution goes on, rise to other 
dispositions, other habits, which in turn form motivations for human action. In this way 
for example the basic human habit (“the strongest and most alert and persistent of the 
economic motives proper”116) of emulating other people’s achievements is developed; it will 
lead to the development of the leisure class: 
 
Wherever the circumstances or traditions of life lead to an habitual comparison of one person 
with another in point of efficiency, the instinct of workmanship works out in an emulative or 
invidious comparison of persons. The extent to which this result follows depends in some 
considerable degree on the temperament of the population. In any community where such an 
invidious comparison of persons is habitually made, visible success becomes an end sought for its 
                                                 
115 When Theory of the Leisure Class or other works of Institutionalism are regarded as ‘holistic’ (e.g. 
RUTHERFORD MALCOLM, Institutions in Economics: The new and the old institutionalism, Cambridge 
University Press 1994, p.38, or JOHN DAVIS, Handbook of Economic Methodology, Edward Elgar 1998, p250; 
BUSH DONALD,  Thorstein Veblen's Economic Aesthetic, Leonardo, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978) p2; 
WILBER/HARRISON (1978)) then this does very often only entail the rejection of a strict methodological 
individualism due to the focus on holistic entities;  Davis who describes Veblen as holistic ‘in a particular 
sense’ writes: “The term ‘holism’ is used to indicate, that society is more than just a group of individual 
actors, that individuals operate within sets of social conventions and norms that define acceptable objectives 
and established roles and that these social conventions and roles cannot themselves be fully explained in 
purely individualistic terms – in other words, to reject reductionist versions of methodological 
individualism.” Ascribing works of Institutionalism to either one of those two directions highly depends on 
the statements (weak/strong) involved. 
116 VEBLEN(2007), p75 
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own utility as a basis of esteem. Esteem is gained and dispraise is avoided by putting one’s 
efficiency in evidence117. 
 
Via its instincts the individual gives rise to the leisure class in the first place - without 
specifically intending. By its distaste for manual labor and visible success sought for its own 
utility as basis of esteem, the individual seeks to escape unworthy occupations. 
Consumption choices are in a similar manner constructed in resemblance to an 
Individualistic bearing: The individual makes his choice of consumption and occupation 
according to the alternatives given to him, takes notice of those and chooses adequately e.g. 
when displaying a certain amount of leisure. What concerns policy recommendations, it is 
again the individual which can alter its decisions in a certain way so as to change habits and 
institutions which might result in a more efficient allocation of resources. The entire 
theory aims to propagate certain institutions that allow for more efficiency so as to use 
natural resources to their best extent; the individual is crucial to that: 
 
It is of course, on individuals that the system of institutions imposes those conventional 
standards, ideals, and canons of conduct that make up the community’s scheme of life. Scientific 
inquiry in this field, therefore, must deal with individual conduct and must formulate its 
theoretical results in terms of individual conduct.118 
 
The Leisure Class itself, like every other institution in the theory, on the other hand, is 
molded by innumerable individuals and possesses the power to coerce and constrain the 
individual on its own and not with regard to the individuals involved. For obvious reasons 
many concepts can be considered holistic; they are more than the sum of its parts. If at a 
certain point in time every the leisure class would suddenly be void of individuals, then it 
would yet continue to be of influence to the choices of the individual and the respective 
traits exhibited. 
 
                                                 
117 VEBLEN(2007), p16 
118 VEBLEN (1909), p243 
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The institution of a leisure class hinders cultural development immediately (1) by the inertia 
proper to the class itself, (2) through its prescriptive example of conspicuous waste and of 
conservatism, and (3) indirectly through that system of unequal distribution of wealth and 
sustenance on which the institution itself rests.119 
 
In reference to the previously given example of property/ownership a similar proof can be 
given - the individual is formed by institutions as he in turn has the power to form them 
himself. Since ‘ownership’ is a growing institution itself, it possesses a power of its own and 
can decidedly influence the individual; in changing the object of invidious comparison 
(from warlike trophies of booty to money) it demonstrates that capability. 
 
[..]  as the custom of individual ownership begins to gain consistency, the point of view taken in 
making the invidious comparison on which private property rests will begin to change.[…] The 
initial phase of ownership, the phase of acquisition by naïve seizure and conversion, begins to 
pass into the subsequent stage of an incipient organisation of industry on the basis of private 
property (in slaves); the horde develops into a more or less self-sufficing industrial community;120 
 
On the opposite it is the individual who appropriates to his personal use and creates the 
institution of ownership in the first place. 
 
The habitual appropriation and consumption of certain slight personal effects goes on without 
raising the question of ownership; that is to say, the question of a conventional, equitable claim 
to extraneous things.121 
 
Theory of the Leisure Class implements the Veblenite program: Institutions are a product of 
the individuals of a group, but in turn they have the capacity to affect the wants and 
preferences of them. Alleged reconciliation between the two fundamental entities of 
explanation is not able to “solve” the agency-structure problem in a strict sense or admit a 
                                                 
119 VEBLEN (2007), p136 
120 VEBLEN (2007), p23 
121 VEBLEN (2007), p21 
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solution with more explanatory power. However it fundamentally broadens the perspective 
of economics as to what matters are of decisive influence for decisions under scarcity. 
Institutionalism does not rest its explanations categorically on one entity what regards 
economic phenomena, but admits two interdependent units. The interdependencies 
between both fundamental units in turn also allow the formulation of cumulative 
causation in the first place.  
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3. Conclusion 
 
The approach of Veblenite institutionalism is a definitive economic theory which has been 
conceived in order to account for deficits of contemporary economics theories. Inspired by 
the explanatory power of evolutionary and genetic science (in the realm of natural 
phenomena)122 Evolutionary Economics tried to position itself as an alternative to 
deductive neoclassical thought, changing the very structure of the given explanations; it 
features the solution to a series of methodological problems. 
Veblen’s solution to the agency/structure dichotomy takes care of problems associated with 
an overemphasis on either explanatory entity. The infinite regress, which is the result of 
questioning a layer of alleged institution-free-state as insinuated by Menger, stops at the 
moment of declaring both entities interdependent; furthermore it explains not only, how 
individual preferences and purposes may change but also how structural entities are 
influenced by individuals.  
Veblen’s solution in modeling human decisions however can be seen as an enhancement to 
rational choice theory. While on the one hand instincts and habits may account for certain 
behavior, they do not replace the model of rational choice but are a mere addition to it. 
When an agent is faced with the decision whether to consummate certain goods or not, he 
is bound to be highly influenced by (e.g.) his propensity for emulation; then he may very 
well rate alternatives in terms of utility, however incorporating honor into his scheme of 
valuation.  Hence instead of measuring expected future monetary gains and losses, an 
agent’s calculation rests on his gains in terms of invidious distinction. 
The method of cumulative causation is questionable. Veblen’s positions are hypotheses 
which he tries to support by evidence he only selects from personal experience and puts 
into order accordingly; this reality he extends progressively (conspicuous consumption, 
secondary leisure class, vicarious leisure…), as he puts new data into place. However if 
evidence does not fit into the constructed model, the hypotheses are rearranged or 
                                                 
122 PAUL USELDING, Veblen as Teacher and Thinker in 1896-97: The Hagerty Notes on How the Economist 
derived his Criticism of the Structure of Classical Economic Theory,  American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), p395 
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discarded. 123 Verification takes more the form of a continuing expansion of the model124 as 
it is continually refined. (introduction of aesthetics, discussion of religion, higher learning 
etc.)  This contextual verification does not result in a body of logically consistent 
conclusions, as does deductive reasoning; regardless of that, it is  continually more difficult 
(as more data is put into according places) to imagine any other explanation than the ones 
suggested by Veblen.  
The alternative solutions suggested to the problems of explanation presented here broadly 
reflect the belief that an explanation in Economics should contain informationally rich, 
causal explanations. Theory of the Leisure Class as the exponent of that very view is not a 
general theory and hence does no try to give explanations to any phenomenon a scientist 
might encounter, however it aims to explain within its limited field of interest – which is 
the vicinity of the so called Leisure Class. As such it can answer certain questions which 
Neoclassicism125 cannot: Whenever a neoclassical agent buys a good then he does so, 
because he maximizes his utility. Why his utility is maximized by buying a good that has 
almost no practical value for him cannot be answered. How and by which influences this 
propensity did emerge is also not of Neoclassicism’s concern. Theory of the Leisure Class 
however can put an answer to these questions; the explanatory power of the informal 
account of “the material means of life” that Veblen proposes, rests in the underlying causes 
it assigns to certain economic phenomena. 126 ”A theory does not explain anything unless it 
points to an underlying causal mechanism. In the case of individual and human behavior, 
explanations must thus relate to mechanisms of the human psyche and human interaction 
and perhaps draw upon psychology, anthropology sociology and other disciplines. This is 
precisely what many advocates of utility theory refuse to do. They take the utility functions 
                                                 
123 HARRISON(1978). p76 
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125 nor any other contemporary economic theory 
126 See also BLAUG (1980), p13 who hints that economic theories can also be “attempts to uncover causal 
forces at work in the economic system”. Daniel Little calls this a “Galilean” model of social explanation. 
LITTLE, Marxism and Method, 
http://www.personal.umd.umich.edu/~delittle/resources/Marxism%20and%20method.pdf p5 
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as given and consign the job of grounding them theoretically to somebody else. By this 
refusal they indicate that utility theory itself cannot provide a real explanation.”127 
Apart from the fact that Veblenite institutionalism fails to construct a logically consistent 
body, the increased informational content comes at an additional price. Veblenite 
institutionalism sees itself unable to make (economic) predictions of any kind or to be of 
service as a policy guidance instrument; an “economic study of institutions” does content 
itself with outlining how individuals acquire behavior and habits of thought and what 
interconnections and phenomena might be a result thereof. Theory of the Leisure class forms 
part of a definitive economic theory which rests its legitimacy on a premise that is in stark 
contrast to traditional economics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 Hodgson however very much sees the importance of Veblen’s contribution foremost in the ability to 
explain preferences of individuals. HODGSON (2001), p242 
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Abstract: 
 
As a seminal work of Institutionalism Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class is 
much more than a satiric comment on late 19th century upper society. It features the 
implementation of Veblen’s program of Evolutionary Economics, an alternative method of 
economic theory entirely different to neoclassical economics. The thesis aims to outline the 
importance of Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class and the implemented program by its 
ability to solve four methodological problems: causality – or the problem how to devise a 
scientific explanation in the social sciences; agency/structure – or the problem of the 
fundamental entity of explanation; decision modeling – the problem of modeling the 
human capacity for reasoning and decision-making; specificity – or the problem of how to 
cope with changing social surroundings. The respective problem situation is created by 
analyzing Veblen’s criticism of contemporary economic theories; the problem solutions are 
being inferred via Theory of the Leisure Class. A common characteristic of the solutions is 
their ability to alter the explanatory power of the resulting economic theory; however the 
price is its inability to make economic predictions. 
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Zusammenfassung: 
 
Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class ist ein Schlüsselwerk der 
Institutionenökonomie, die exklusive Vereinnahmung als satirische Gesellschaftskritik 
ungerechtfertigt. Es implementiert Veblen’s Programm von Evolutionary Economics, einer 
Methode ökonomischer Theoriebildung die sich gegen den Neoklassizismus behaupten 
will. Die Diplomarbeit sucht die Bedeutung von Theory of the Leisure Class und dem 
implementierten Programm in der Fähigkeit, vier fundamentale methodologische 
Probleme neu zu lösen: causality – oder das Problem wie eine Erklärung in den 
Sozialwissenschaften auszusehen habe; agency/structure - oder das Problem der 
fundamentalsten Einheit der Erklärung, decison modeling -  das Problem der 
Modellierung von menschlichem Entscheidungsverhalten; sowie specificity - das Problem 
der Relativität von Sozialem. Die entsprechende Problemsituation wird dazu aus Veblen’s 
Kritik zeitgenössischer ökonomischer Theorien entwickelt; die neuen Problemlösungen 
werden aus Theory of the Leisure Class abgeleitet. Die Lösungen haben gemeinsam, dass sie 
die Erklärungskraft einer daraus formulierten ökonomischen Theorie erheblich steigern, sie 
geht aber zu Lasten der Fertigkeit auch ökonomische Prognosen machen zu können. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
